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This paper studies the Ramsey problem of optimal labor income taxation in a simple model 
economy which deviates from a first  best representative agent economy in three important 
aspects, namely, flat rate second best tax, monopoly power in intermediate product market, 
and monopolistic wage setting. There are three key findings: (1) In order to correct for 
monopoly distortion the Ramsey tax prescription is to set the labor income tax rate lower 
than its competitive market analogue; (2) Government’s optimal tax policy is independent of 
its fiscal treatment of distributed pure profits; and (3) For higher levels of monopoly 
distortions Ramsey policy is more desirable than the first best policy. The key analytical 
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Monopoly Power and Optimal Taxation of Labor Income 
 
 
1.0  Introduction. 
 
Until very recently, the dynamic general equilibrium tradition of optimal taxation seemed 
more or less silent about the departure from the simplifying assumption of economy-wide 
competitive markets. To my knowledge, apart from the recent attempts by Judd (1997), Guo 
& Lansing (1999), Judd (2002), Koskela & Thadden (2002), Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2004a) 
and Selim (2005), most general equilibrium models of Ramsey taxation with representative 
agent established in literature that deal specifically with optimal income taxation typically 
consider environments without imperfections in private markets. M odern economies are, 
however, characterized by distortions from imperfect competition in private market, which 
implies that economic welfare is lower than what it could have been if markets were fully 
competitive
1. Relaxing the economy-wide competitive markets assumption therefore is likely 
to identify stronger descriptions of the incentive structure underlying an optimal tax policy. 
 
This paper first develops a model of a two-sector neoclassical production economy with 
tax distortions and distortions arising from monopoly power in pricing of intermediate goods. 
In the relevant literature, it is a well-known finding that with private market distortions 
optimal taxes perform a corrective function that assists in minimizing productive inefficiency. 
The main focus of this paper is the optimal labor income tax policy and its corrective role in 
the presence of private market imperfections. The paper develops a basic model of optimal 
labor income taxation in an environment where firms in the intermediate goods sector create 
distortions by manipulating prices through the exploitation of a downward sloping demand 
curve for their output. This formulation of monopoly power is drawn primarily from the work 
of Dixit & S tiglitz (1977). The basic model is then extended  with the introduction of 
monopolistic wage setting. With imperfectly competitive labor market, the source of non-tax 
distortions diversifies and a natural intuition is that the Ramsey policies tend to be more 
corrective in nature. 
 
The framework developed in this paper is simple but useful and insightful since its 
economy-wide perfect competition analogue is embedded for a particular value of the 
parameter that indexes the degree of monopoly power. The government’s quest is to find the 
                                                 
1 Jonsson (2004) presents the recent empirical evidence of this fact for the US economy.   3 
optimal level of a single tax, which in this setting is the labor income tax. This simple setting 
allows one to exclusively examine the temporal pattern of a corrective tax and the particular 
characteristics of its period by period effects. With the basic framework and its extension to 
imperfectly competitive labor market, the paper derives the first best tax rules and the Ramsey 
tax rules, and discusses, both analytically and quantitatively, how these are designed to offset 
the distortions due to monopoly power. 
 
Three main results emerge from this paper --- (1) government’s optimal choice of labor 
income tax rate with monopoly distortions is completely independent of how government 
treats taxes on distributed profits; (2) the optimal tax rate with monopoly distortions is lower 
than its competitive market analogue, which holds irrespective of how the government treats 
distributed profits fiscally; and ( 3) for remarkably high degrees of monopoly power, 
economic agents prefer distorting Ramsey taxes than first best taxes. 
 
The corrective function of optimal taxes in economies with private market distortions has 
been through an exciting process of intellectual investigations. The main concentration --- 
perhaps due to its political sensitivity --- has been the optimal capital income tax policy. Judd 
(1999) in a competitive market model shows that a positive tax on asset income generates 
exponentially growing MRS/MRT distortions among goods over time. Since such explosive 
distortions are inconsistent with commodity taxation, the long run tax on capital income must 
be zero. This is however not the long run optimal policy when private market distortions 
violate the productive efficiency condition, as may be found in Guo & Lansing (1999), 
Koskela & Thadden (2002), Golosov et al. (2003) and Judd (2002 & 2003). In the presence of 
private market distortions where the efficiency condition is already violated, optimal fiscal 
policy can be designed to alleviate the distortion, or more precisely, as a corrective device for 
the distortions. 
 
The corrective function of optimal labor income taxes has been partly emphasized in the 
literature by using models that involve both labor and capital taxes. But as mentioned earlier, 
the capital income tax policy has dominated the intellectual discussions. The paper by 
Koskela & Thadden (2002) is an exception, which for instance shows that with imperfectly 
competitive labor market the wage tax policy faces two conflicting demands when capital tax 
is set at zero. Due to such conflict, Koskela & Thadden (2002) argue that both instruments 
should be used, which in turn invalidates the zero capital income tax result. In referring to 
optimal labor income tax policy, Guo & Lansing (1999) argue that when distributed profits 
can be fully taxed, the entire revenue raising tax burden falls on labor, while capital income   4 
receives a subsidy as a corrective device. This result is also one of the key findings in Judd 
(2002). 
 
With a much greater emphasis on optimal capital taxation, the relevant literature allows 
some scope to contribute in resolving the specific concerns related to optimal labor income 
taxation with private market imperfections. This is exactly where the current paper is intended 
to contribute. The three main results of this paper are based on strong intuitions and therefore 
provide some very useful insights into these policy issues. The first result  may not be 
surprising but its underlying intuition is subtle. In the model economy considered here, profits 
actually represent the income to a fixed factor, namely, monopoly power. It is trivial that with 
this formulation the Ramsey planner would like to tax profits at a rate of 100% and reduce 
other distorting taxes. In reality, however, governments cannot implement a  complete 
confiscation of this type of income. This may be due to the situation where the government is 
unable to distinguish profits from other income (or firms  somehow hiding profits). The 
political viability and the consequential practicality of such a policy are also of considerable 
reservation. If the government cannot tax distributed profits separately, in an economy 
without capital a single tax rate applied to labor income must also function as a profit tax. 
 
In order to consider a range of non-confiscatory profit tax solutions, this paper introduces a 
non-negative parameter that linearly characterizes the government’s fiscal treatment of 
profits. Different values of this parameter characterize the different relative weight attached to 
profit taxation. It is shown that for all plausible values of this parameter, both the first best 
labor income tax rule and the Ramsey tax rule remain unaffected. This is because distributed 
pure economic profit is not one of the choice variables for the households’ optimization 
problem (unless otherwise specified) implying that profits and profit taxes do not influence 
households’ allocation decisions at the margin. The household’s equilibrium allocation 
decisions are sensitive to labor income tax rate which has both income and welfare effects at 
the margin. In the Ramsey equilibrium, the government’s optimal choice of labor income tax 
rate is therefore independent of how the government treats profit for taxation. 
 
The second result is the normative benchmark of optimal taxation with monopoly 
distortions. The popular intuition of making a welfare maximizing distorting tax a curative 
device for monopoly distortions can effectively be attributed to this result. This result is 
driven by the fact that distortions interact, and cost of one distortion depends on the level of 
another. Since monopoly distortions drive a wedge between social and private returns to 
factors, setting the optimal tax rate lower than its competitive market analogue can 
compensate for the loss in output in the economy. Put differently, a relatively lower labor   5 
income tax than its competitive market analogue is optimal since it compensates for the 
monopoly induced distorted margin between social and private returns to labor. The first best 
tax policy in the presence of monopoly power is to subsidize labor income and impose a 
heavy lump sum tax which finances both the inevitable government expenditure and the 
subsidy. In the Ramsey equilibrium, for some degrees of monopoly power there is an optimal 
labor income tax, and after a threshold level of monopoly power it becomes optimal to 
subsidize labor income. The threshold level depends on the number of non-tax distortions. 
Hence starting from the competitive market analogue, higher degrees of monopoly power are 
associated with lower levels of Ramsey taxes, and after the threshold level higher levels of 
Ramsey subsidies. This result holds irrespective of how the government treats profit taxes. 
 
For higher degree of monopoly power, there are more than proportionate increments in the 
wedge between social and private marginal returns to factors. This is because an elastically 
demanded good (or factor) sold with a price mark up possess a multiplier like demand shock 
effect. Since this effect induces more than proportionate increase in the wedge, its curative 
device must also be equivalently responsive. For remarkably high levels of price mark up (or 
wage mark up), the first best subsidy is higher but so is the lump sum tax. Economic agents 
facing such a situation will therefore be less willing to replace distorting Ramsey taxes with 
lump sum taxes. For high degrees of monopoly power, the utility cost of Ramsey taxes are 
therefore relatively lower, which explains the third important result of this chapter. 
 
The idea that monopoly power and pure profits are important in determining the function 
and optimal choice of tax rates has a long history, however. In a well known paper, Stiglitz & 
Dasgupta (1971) show that the optimal commodity tax policy for a monopolistic industry with 
a bound on profit taxation generally includes both differential taxes and subsidies. In a 
dynamic general equilibrium, differential commodity taxation is accomplished by introducing 
a distortion of the savings decision so that present and future consumption goods are taxed at 
different rates. This intuition is most commonly held for the interpretation of an optimal 
nonzero capital tax in models where firms in a particular sector practices monopoly power 
(see for instance, Guo & Lansing (1999), Judd (2002 & 2003), and Selim (2005)). Moreover, 
Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) argue that the existence of pure profits may require a deviation 
from the productive efficiency condition, implying that taxes should generally be levied on 
final and not on intermediate goods. This important finding is ignored in Myles (1989), who 
examine Ramsey taxation with imperfect competition but abstracts from general equilibrium 
with both intermediate and final goods. 
   6 
This paper contributes by extending the relevant literature with the introduction of a model 
which perhaps is the simplest in its family but is capable of imitating the labor income tax 
policy process in the real world. The policy issue and the key results presented in this paper 
are of extreme importance. Many macroeconomic policies aimed towards outlawing 
monopolies and price agreements are actually targeted to enhance competition. There is a 
popular debate between the proponents of direct regulations and advocates of fiscal policy 
about the choice of an appropriate policy that effectively enhances competition. This paper 
does not pretend to examine the details of this debate, but does attempt to establish the 
usefulness of labor income tax policy in compensating the distorted margins of allocations 
due to private market imperfection
2. In the next section, a model of a simple economy where 
firms in the intermediate goods sector possess some degree of monopoly power and 
government taxes labor income and distributed profits to finance preset revenue target, is 
developed. The optimal taxation problem is presented in section 3.0. Section 4.0 introduces 
monopolistic wage setting in the model economy. Section 5.0 calibrates the model for the 
post war US economy and presents some intuitive quantitative results. Section 6.0 concludes. 
 
 
2.0  The Model Economy.   
 
Consider a simple model economy without physical capital  that consists of households, 
firms, and the government. Time t is discrete and runs forever. The production environment 
has two sectors: one producing intermediate goods and the other producing final goods. In the 
remainder of this paper, I will hold the final good as the numeraire. The final goods sector of 
the economy is characterized by perfectly competitive markets. Producers of intermediate 
goods may possess a degree of monopoly power and hence can earn positive economic 
profits. All firms are owned by households who receive profits in the form of dividends. The 
closest (and perhaps wealthier) relatives of this model are the ones used in Guo & Lansing 
                                                 
2 It is often argued in the literature that taxation is relatively more effective as a policy device in enhancing 
competition. The basic idea behind this argument is that since imperfect competition creates a marginal distortion 
in the productive efficiency condition of an economy, tax policy must be designed in a manner such that it 
minimizes the inequality between marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation among goods. 
With no concerns of redistribution, the Ramsey taxes in such settings become more of a corrective nature rather 
than revenue-raising nature.  
 
Auerbach & Hines Jr. (2001b), on the other hand, argue that other policy instruments, such as enforcement of 
antitrust, may be more cost-effective at correcting the distortions of private market imperfections. In line with Judd 
(2003), I agree that this view has limited scope both intuitively and empirically, since there is no (or insignificant) 
evidence that pricing above marginal cost is related to violations of antitrust law. It is therefore difficult to think of 
any policy instrument other than taxation which could counterbalance the distortions due to imperfect competition, 
when say, a firm is pricing its innovated output above marginal cost since it owns a copyright that legally entitles it 
to do so. In a separate paper, Auerbach & Hines Jr. (2001a) however admit that when it is possible to identify 
imperfectly competitive market structure, an appropriate set of taxes and subsidies as a curative device is more 
attractive to policymakers than regulatory devices.   7 
(1999) and Selim (2005). This model is later extended in section 4.0 where the labor market is 
subject to imperfect competition due to monopolistic wage setting.  
 
More specifically, there is a continua of measure one of identical infinitely-lived 
households, each of whom are endowed with one unit of time at each instant and ownership 
of firms. The one unit of time can be allocated to a combination of work and leisure. In the 
final goods sector there is a continua of measure one of identical firms that own a technology 
with which a perishable final good, t y , can be produced combining a continuum of 
intermediate goods  jt z , with  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ j . The final good can be used for private consumption 
) ( t c  and exogenously determined government consumption  ) ( t g . The final good is 



















1 dj z y jt t                 (1.1) 
 
where  ) , [ 1 0 ˛ s  indexes the  degree of monopoly power exercised by suppliers of the 
intermediate good  jt z . With this specification, 
1 - s  is the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate goods, and for  0 = s  intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in the 
production of final goods making the intermediate goods market perfectly competitive. On the 
other hand,  1 ﬁ s  represents very low elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 
giving higher market power to firms in the intermediate goods sector. 
 
The intermediate goods sector comprises of  j  firms who own a technology with which a 
continuum of intermediate goods  ) ( jt z  can be produced using labor service  ) ( jt n  as the only 
input. The technology is defined as: 
 
a
jt jt n z =                   (1.2) 
 
where  ] , ( 1 0 ˛ a . 
 
The representative household supplies labor service to firms in the intermediate goods 
sector. Since all households are identical, they have identical preferences over consumption of 
final good and labor supply. At each period, the representative household derives utility from   8 
consumption  ) ( t c  and disutility from labor service  ) ( t n . Preferences for the representative 






t n c u ) , ( b                  (2) 
 
where  ) , ( 1 0 ˛ b  is the subjective discount rate. The utility function  R R
2 ﬁ + : u  is 
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, strictly 
concave, and satisfies standard Inada conditions, namely  , ) ( )] ( [ lim ¥ =
-
ﬁ t u t u c n ct
1




¥ ﬁ ) ( )] ( [ lim t u t u c n ct  for any  0 > n . 
 
The government consumes exogenous  t g  of the final good each period and has, at its 
disposal, taxation of labor income and pure distributed profits as the fiscal instruments to 
finance the predetermined revenue target. The proportional tax rate is denoted by  t t . Since 
profits influence household’s decisions only through an income effect, a trivial solution for 
the government would be to confiscate profits by taxing it at a rate of 100% and reduce other 
distorting taxes. In order to consider other optimal solutions, consider the situation where 
government taxes profits at a rate  t kt , where k  is a parameter and  0
1 ‡ ‡
- k t t . In the 
Ramsey equilibrium, different values of the parameter k  will illustrate the government’s 
fiscal treatment of distributed profits. For instance,  0 = k  implies profits escape all direct 
taxation, and  1 = k  implies profits and labor income are taxed at the same rate
3. 
 
The government also trades one period bonds to households, and  1 + t b  denotes real 
government bonds carried into period  1 + t , which pay interest at the rate  bt r . Interest earning 
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3 For 
1 - = t t k profits are taxed at the rate of 100%, although in most parts of the analysis this obvious case is 
ignored.   9 
where  jt w denotes real wage, and  jt p denotes pure profits. The government is benevolent, i.e. 
it maximizes welfare of the economy. The government bonds in this environment perform the 
role of a policy instrument that is orthogonal to the labor income tax policy, i.e. with fixed 
government spending any tax reform can be supported by an increase or decrease in the level 
of government’s indebtness to the private sector. 
 
2.1  Firms’ Problems. 
 
Let  j p  denote the relative price of intermediate good  j z . The representative firm in the 



























max dj z p dj z jt jt jt
z jt
s
s             (4.1) 
 
The first order condition with respect to a change in  jt z  yields the inverse demand 
function of the  j th intermediate good: 
 
s s - = jt t jt z y p                  (4.2) 
 
Firms in the intermediate goods sector possess monopoly power in pricing and face the 
demand function (4.2) for  j th intermediate good. The firms take the wage rate and prices of 
other firms as given when choosing price and labor to maximize profits. The decision 
problem of the representative firm in the intermediate goods sectors is: 
 
] [ max
, jt jt jt jt n p n w z p
jt jt
-               (4.3)   
a
jt jt n z t s = . .  
 
s s - = jt t jt z y p  
 
The first order condition for maximum profits is: 
 
jt jt jt jt z p n w ) 1 ( s a - =               (4.4)   10 
 
I will restrict my attention to a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate 
goods sector produce at the same level, employ the same labor and charge the same relative 
price. It is important to make this assumption here, although a much detailed illustration of 
the equilibrium is presented later. The symmetry assumption simplifies  t jt n n =  and 
t jt p p =  for all  j . Moreover, (1.1) and (1.2) imply that the aggregate production technology 
is given by: 
 
a
t t n y =                   (4.5) 
 
Since the final goods sector is characterized by perfectly competitive markets, firms 









-￿ jt jt t z p y . Using (4.2) in 
the zero profit condition and imposing symmetry yields  1 = = t jt p p  for all  j . Moreover, 
the symmetric equilibrium imposed on (4.4) together with  1 = = t jt p p  gives the equilibrium 
wage rate: 
 
1 ) ( ) 1 (
- - = t t t n z w s a                (4.6) 
 
Using (4.6), the equilibrium profits for the intermediate goods sector is given by: 
 
)] 1 ( 1 [ s a p - - = t t z                 (4.7) 
 
Since the parameter s  controls the degree of monopoly power, it is also associated with 
the equilibrium profit to output ratio. The equilibrium profit to output ratio for this model is 
linked to the degree of returns to scale in intermediate goods sector and the parameter s . It is 
convenient to express the relationship between equilibrium profit to output ratio and the price 



















1                 (4.8) 
   11 
where m  denotes the price mark up ratio. If for instance the profit ratio is  % 5  and degree of 
returns to scale in the intermediate goods sector is 1, equation (4.8) gives  05 1. = m . With 
1 = a , the profit ratio is simply equal to s . According to Basu & Fernald’s (1997) estimates 
on typical US industry profit ratio, the value of the price mark up ratio assuming constant 
returns to scale technology in manufacturing industry is  03 1. . More recent empirical 
estimates of price mark up ratio from a study by Bayoumi, Laxton & Pesenti (2004) are equal 
to  23 1.  for the overall US economy and  35 1.  for the Euro area. The estimate for the US for 
instance, assuming that  1 = a  in the current setting amounts to an estimate of s  equal to 
186 0.  (for the Euro area it is  259 0. ). The other estimates established in literature also 
indicate lack of competition in the Euro area as compared to the US economy (see Martins, 
Scarpetta & Pilat (1996) for details). 
 
To get an idea of how the distortion created by monopoly power affects factor return, 
consider the social marginal product of labor given by  ] ) ( [
1 -
t t n z a . For  0 > s  implying 
practice of monopoly power, the equilibrium wage rate given by (4.6) is less than its social 
marginal product by an amount  ] ) ( [
1 -
t t n z as .  
 
2.2  Household’s Problem. 
 
Each of the continua of measure one of infinitely-lived households intertemporally 
chooses allocations to maximize a stream of discounted utilities over consumption and labor. 










b n c n c u
t t t
b                (5.1) 
. .t s  
t t t bt t t t t t b r n w b c p kt t ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 - + + + - £ + +         (5.2) 
 
where  0 b  is given, and standard non-negativity restrictions apply. The  representative 
household views  t bt t r w p , ,  and the government’s tax policy as determined outside of their 
control. In addition, it is also assumed that there is no intra-household trading of bonds. This 
is assumed simply to avoid the complexities of having a private market for bonds. It is, 
however, acknowledged that relaxing this assumption may be interesting for future research. 
Given the main purpose of this paper, holding this assumption is fairly understandable.    12 
 
The first order conditions for this problem, with  ) 1 ( bt bt r R + ” , are the period budget 
constraint (5.2) itself and the followings: 
 
t t c n w t u t u ) 1 )( ( ) ( t - = -               (5.3a) 
1 ) 1 ( ) ( + + = bt c c R t u t u b                (5.3b) 
0 ) ( lim 1 = + ¥ ﬁ t c
t
t b t u b               (5.3c) 
 
Equation (5.3a) states that the representative household’s utility is at its maximum when 
the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption is equal to the price ratio of 
labor to consumption. Equation  (5.3b) is the standard Euler equation which makes the 
household indifferent between consuming today and saving for a later date at the optimum. 
Equation  (5.3c)  is  the transversality condition  that  states that the discounted utility is 
maximum when the present discounted value of government bonds in terms of consumption is 
zero as time goes to infinity. 
 
2.3  Equilibrium. 
 
For the following definition symbols without time subscripts represent one-sided infinite 
sequence of the corresponding variable. 
 
Definition 2.3 (Equilibrium).   An equilibrium is an allocation  ) , , , ( y z n c , a price 
system  ) , , ( b r p w , and a government policy  ) , ( b t , such that 
 
(1)  given the price system and government policy, the allocation solves the firms’ 
problems and the household’s problem; 
(2)  given the price system and allocation, the government policy satisfies the sequence of 
government budget constraints (3); and 
(3)  all markets clear in the long run.             •  
 
The equilibrium as defined above is characterized by the following system (6.1) for the set 
of endogenous variables  } , , , , , , , , { t t t t t t t t t y z p w b n c t p : 
 
   13 
1 0 £ < t n                   (a) 
t t t g c y + =                   (b) 
t t z y =                   (c) 
a
t t n z =                   (d) 
t t c n w t u t u ) 1 )( ( ) ( t - = -               (e) 
1 ) 1 ( ) ( + + = bt c c R t u t u b                (f) 
0 ) ( lim 1 = + ¥ ﬁ t c
t
t b t u b               (g) 
1 ) ( ) 1 (
- - = t t t n z w s a                (h) 
)] 1 ( 1 [ s a p - - = t t z                 (i) 
s s - = t t t z y p                   (j) 
 
With  (6.1b, c & d), the model economy’s aggregate resource constraint in terms of 
allocations is simply: 
 
a
t t t n g c = +                   (6.2) 
 
 
3.0  Optimal Taxation. 
 
With  0 b r  and  t g  specified exogenously, the optimal taxation problem for the government 
is to choose an implementable allocation 
¥
=0 } , { t t t n c  to maximize household’s utility defined 
by (2). The notion of implementable allocations deserves further explanation in the current 
context. For each arbitrarily chosen fiscal policy of the government, there is a unique 
equilibrium allocation and prices from system (6.1). This can be verified by solving (6.1) for 
any fixed policy. Thus the set of allocations that are consistent with (6.1) is implementable as 
equilibrium. If a particular tax policy that maximizes welfare is consistent with the 
implementable allocations, it is consistent with equilibrium feedback of the taxpayers. Given 
the preset revenue target of the government, the optimal taxation problem for the government 
is to choose from the set of implementable allocations an allocation that maximizes welfare, 
such that the resulting taxes and prices along with allocations are consistent with the 
equilibrium. This approach is the primal approach to optimal taxation problem. 
   14 
Put more technically, the optimal taxation problem for the government in this model 
economy is simply a programming problem of choosing 
¥
=0 } , { t t t n c  to maximize household’s 
utility defined by  (2) subject  to  (a) the resource constraint defined by  (6.2), and  (b) an 
implementability constraint that ensures the resulting taxes and prices along with allocations 
are consistent with the equilibrium system  (6.1). Since  t g  is specified exogenously, this 
approach to the optimal taxation problem is in fact one characterization of the underlying 
Ramsey problem. The implementability constraint is an intertemporal constraint involving 
only allocations and initial conditions, and is typically derived  by using equilibrium 
conditions to recursively substitute out prices and taxes in the household’s present-value 
budget constraint. The implementability constraint for the current model is: 
 
0 0 1 0 0
0
= - - - + ￿
¥
=
b R u t u n t u c t u b c t t c t n t c
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1     (7.1b) 
 
3.1  The Ramsey Problem. 
 
The Ramsey problem for the government is to choose a policy that maximizes welfare 
defined by  (2) subject to the government budget constraint defined by  (3) such that the 
resulting policy and the associated allocations and  prices are consistent with equilibrium 
feedback of taxpayers.  According to the primal approach, this problem can be characterized 
as one where the government chooses 
¥
=0 } , { t t t n c  to maximize household’s utility defined by 
(2) subject to (6.2),  (7.1a & b). Let  0 ‡ F  be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
implementability constraint, and define the Pseudo objective function as: 
 
] ) )( ( ) ( ) ( [ ) , ( ) , , ( t t c t n t c t t t t t u n t u c t u n c u n c V p kt - - + F + ” F 1     (8.1) 
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With 
¥
=0 t t} {c as the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint (6.2), the 




0 b R u g c n n c V J b c t t t t t t
t
t ) ( )} ( ) , , ( { F - - - + F =￿
¥
=
a c b       (8.2) 
 
For exogenously determined  0 b t R g ,  and  0 b , the Ramsey problem amounts to 
maximizing (8.2) with respect to 
¥
=0 } , { t t t n c . The consolidated first order conditions for an 
optimum for this problem due to changes in allocations are: 
 
1
1 ‡ " - =
- t n t V t V t c n
a a ) ( ) (            (8.3a) 
) ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 cn b c b cc n u b R n V b R u V F + - F =
- a a       (8.3b) 
 
The Ramsey equilibrium is therefore characterized by a system of equations comprising 
(8.3), (7.1), and (6.2).  
 
Note first that the Lagrange multiplier  F represents the utility cost of raising revenue 
through distorting taxes. In other words,  F is the amount in units of time 0 consumption that 
households would be willing to pay in order to replace one unit of distorting tax revenue by 
one unit of lump sum tax revenue. To solve the system for Ramsey allocations and Ramsey 
taxes, one can fix F and solve (8.3) and (6.2) for an allocation. Then one can substitute these 
allocations in the implementability constraint  (7.1), and depending on whether the 
implementability constraint is binding or slack, one can increase or decrease the value of F. 
Once the resulting allocations satisfy the implementability constraint, a unique value of F is 
obtained, and allocations and prices constitute equilibrium as defined in 2.3. 
 
In the next section it is shown that a unique steady state Ramsey tax rule exists for a 
unique value of the multiplier F. Furthermore, in section 5.0 it is formally demonstrated that 
for a unique steady state allocation there exists a unique value of the multiplier F. In general, 
for a  0 ‡ T  for which fluctuations in government expenditure is arbitrarily small for all 
T t ‡ , the solution to  (8.3) can be characterized by a set of stationary allocation rules 
) , , ( F - - 1 1 t t t n c c  and  ) , , ( F - - 1 1 t t t n c n . Given these allocation rules, one can use (4.6), (5.3), 
and  (6.1d) to compute a set of stationary rules for the factor price and tax rate: 
) , , ( F - - 1 1 t t t n c w  and  ) , , ( F - - 1 1 t t t n c t  for  T t ‡ . A stationary allocation rule for government   16 
bonds can be computed by recursively solving the household’s budget constraint (5.2) by 
substituting out prices and taxes for allocations. The optimal allocations for  T t £  can be 
computed by solving  (8.3) backwards in time, starting from  T t =  and by imposing the 
stationary allocation rules for  T t ‡  as the boundary conditions. The entire sequence of 
allocations, together with the initial conditions, determines the multiplier  F such that the 
implementability constraint (7.1) is satisfied.   
 
3.2  Fiscal Policy. 
 
If the government had an access to a lump sum tax  ) ( t l ”  and could take up the first best 
tax policy, the equilibrium allocations would coincide with those chosen by a benevolent 
social planner who maximizes utility as defined by (2) subject to the resource constraint (6.2). 
To find the first best policy, add the term  t l  to the right hand side of the symmetric version 
of the government’s budget constraint (3). In this problem government bond do not affect the 
equilibrium allocations, and hence it is convenient to set  0 = t b  for all  t. 
 
Proposition 1:   The first best fiscal policy corresponding to equilibrium  (6.1) is to 
subsidize labor income, and generate all revenues by a lump sum tax. In particular, the first 
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Proof:    Let 
1
t
tl b  be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint 
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   17 









t  which is 
strictly negative for  ) , ( 1 0 ˛ s . The government’s budget constraint with lump sum tax then 





+ = 1 1
1
t t t y g l  after substituting for 
1
t t tn w t , and  t p .  • 
 
A welfare maximizing social planner would seek to implement an allocation which is 
characterized by the optimality condition  (8.4). To replicate these conditions in an 
(imperfectly) competitive equilibrium, as is inferred from the first order conditions of the 









t . The first best policy therefore involves subsidizing labor income for inefficiency 
due to the monopoly power and generating all revenues by a heavy lump sum tax. 
 
The competitive market analogue of this result, which is derived by setting  0 = s , is zero 
distorting tax and  t t g = l . Moreover, for  ) , ( 1 0 ˛ s  the lump sum tax is strictly greater than 
government’s planned expenditures when profits are taxed at the same rate as labor income 
(i.e.  1 = k ), and when profits are not taxed at all (i.e.  0 = k ). Understandably, the case of 
100% profit tax for the first best fiscal policy is ignored. Note also that for higher degrees of 
monopoly power, both the amount of subsidy and lump sum tax increases, and the rate of 
increase in lump sum tax is higher than that of the first best labor income subsidy. 
 
Now consider the Ramsey policy where government do not have an access to lump sum 
tax. At this point, consider some standard simplifications in the utility function only for the 
sake of analytical tractability. Let  R R
2 ﬁ + : u  be separable in consumption and labor, and 
linear in labor, as supported by Hansen (1985), among others. Imposing these restrictions is 
tantamount to assuming  0 = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( t u t u t u nn nc cn . Furthermore,  assume that there is a 
steady state where fluctuations in government expenditure become arbitrarily small. From 
(8.3a) and (5.3b), the steady state level of the optimal tax rate is given by the following 
equation: 
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    (8.5) 
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Consider the competitive equilibrium version of (8.5) and denote the corresponding steady 
state tax rate by 
p t . This is obtained simply by setting  0 = s  in (8.6), which results in the 
following equation: 
 
]} ) ( [ {
] ) ( [ )]} ( [ {
k a k
p k k a k
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- + F +









       (8.6) 
 
Since the sign and relative magnitudes of t  and 
p t  are rather inconclusive from (8.5) and 
(8.6), I will resort to calibration and numerical results to analyze the key findings. 
Nevertheless, one analytical result is quite insightful and comes right out of the above two 
expressions. 
 
Proposition 2:   If profits are taxed at the same rate as labor income is taxed (i.e. 
1 = k ), equation (8.5) from the Ramsey equilibrium implies that optimal tax rate is lower 
than its competitive market analogue. 
 
Proof:    If profits and labor income are taxed at the same rate, the government cannot 
set  1 ‡ t , since it violates transversality condition  (5.3c). Hence (8.5) with  1 = k  implies 
0 1 > F + F + ] ) ( [ c u u cc c . Comparing  (8.5) with  1 = k   and  (8.6) with  1 = k , it is 
straightforward to show that  0 < - ) (
p t t .            • 
 
The intuition for this result is clear. In the presence of monopoly power, a lower tax rate 
relative to its competitive market analogue is optimal since it offsets the distortions created by 
the monopoly power. As will be shown later, proposition 2 actually holds for all permissible 
values of the parameter k . 
 
 
4.0  Monopolistic Wage Setting. 
 
Consider now the simplest form of monopolistic wage setting behaviour of workers in the 
model. This is in the spirit of Koskela & Thadden (2002). The optimal income taxation 
problem now deviates from a first best representative agent economy in three aspects: first, to 
raise revenue the government must use distorting second best tax; second, the intermediate 
product market is imperfectly competitive; and t hird, the labor market is imperfectly 
competitive and subject to monopolistic wage setting by workers, i.e. wages are set with a   19 
mark up compared to a fully competitive outcome leading to a socially suboptimal level of 
working hours. 
 
Assume that households collectively organize in a trade union which acts as a 
monopolistic wage setter. Wages are set for one period, and the wage setting behaviour takes 
into account the static constraint imposed by the labor demand schedule  ) ( jt jt w n n = . Since 
firms are small relative to the economy, they are unable to behave in a strategic manner 
towards the wage setting behaviour. This assumption abstracts the model from the hold-up 
problem which typically arises under firm specific bargaining. Assume  further  that the 
behaviour of the union is myopic in the sense that intertemporal feedback effects of wage 
setting are not taken into account. The union is also assumed not to influence profits which 
are distributed back to its members. Assume further that the institutional set up which 
generates the market inefficiency is taken as given by the government when designing the tax 
policy, implying that corrective taxes or subsidies are the only channels to address the labor 
and intermediate product market distortion. The proportional tax rate on wage is denoted by 
m
t t . 
 
Recall the profit maximization problem of the representative firm in intermediate goods 
sector. Imposing symmetry, the first order condition to this problem yields the following 
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Acting on behalf of its members, the trade union maximizes utility defined by (2) subject 
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The mark up of net wages over the marginal rate of substitution between  labor and 
consumption is therefore 
) ( s a - 1
1





. Comparing (9.1c) with social 
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Define the Pseudo objective function associated with the Ramsey problem as: 
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where  0 ‡ F
m  is the multiplier associated with the implementability constraint, and 
represents the utility cost of raising revenue by distorting taxes. The Lagrangian for the 
Ramsey problem is: 
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The first order condition with respect to variation in labor supply for  1 ‡ t  is: 
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where, imposing  0 = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( t u t u t u nn nc cn , 
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Assume solution to the Ramsey equilibrium converges to a time-invariant allocation. 
Combining steady state versions of (9.5) and  (9.6)  with  (9.1c & a), one can derive the 
following expression for the steady state optimal tax rule: 
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  (9.7) 
 
Note first that the denominator of the right hand side of expression  (9.7) has the term 
2 1 ) ( s a - , which in expression  (8.5) is  ) ( s - 1 . Although both  (9.7) and  (8.6) include 
mostly the same structural parameters of the model, analytical comparison of these two is not 
conclusive since the multipliers associated with the implementability constraints of these two 
problems are not same. Since the main function of the optimal distorting taxes are corrective, 
and since the sources and levels of market distortions are different in the two models, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that Ramsey taxes will have different social costs. 
 
 
5.0  Calibration and Numerical Results. 
 
I will use US economy’s data to calibrate the model in order to focus on a subset of 
interesting numerical results, which in turns will highlight the key policy findings of this 
paper. In line with the basic assumptions underlying the period utility function given in (2) 
and the assumption  0 = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( t u t u t u nn nc cn , consider the following specification: 
 
] [ ) ln( ) , ( t t t t n c n c u L - + = 1               (10.1) 
 
where  0 > L  is a constant associated with marginal disutility of work. For the model with 
monopolistic wage setting, I will denote this parameter by 
m L . 
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First, consider t he model with perfectly competitive labor market. With  (10.1), and 
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The idea of the calibration is as follows. The set of parameters for the model is 
) , , , , , (
m L L k s a b . First, these parameters are pinned down to fit the stylized facts of the 
US economy for data period 1960-2001. The time period considered is one year which is 
consistent with the frequency of fiscal policy revision. In particular, I will parameterize the 
model for  ) , , , , , (
m L L k s a b  to fit the facts of the US economy for the approximate data 
period of 1960-2001. Some estimates are also used from the literature. Using these pinned 
down values in (10.2) will give estimates of the multipliers  F and 
m F . Then, the set of 
calibrated parameter values and the calibrated multiplier values are used to derive an estimate 
of the optimal tax rate. The two key parameters of the model for which variations may be of 
interest are the profit tax treatment parameter, k , and the parameter associated with market 
power,  s . Once the model has been calibrated, I will vary these two parameters within 
reasonable range to derive insights regarding the sensitivity of the key results with respect to 
these. 
 
5.1  Data and Parameterization. 
 
Annual data of the US economy for the period 1960-2001 are taken from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data-FRED II. According to this data, in seasonally 
adjusted real terms average government consumption to output ratio is equal to  23 0. , profit 
to output ratio is equal to  11 0. , and government bond to output ratio is equal to  51 0. . Since 
the model is without capital, the only interest rate is the interest rate on government bonds. I 
use an interest rate value of  % 6  which is a reasonable approximation of the series of interest   23 
rate on US government securities
4. This is consistent with an estimate of  9434 . 0 = b . 
Working hours estimate is set at  3 0.  which implies that the average time an individual spends 
in employment is about  3
1  of total time. This approximation is frequently used as a 
benchmark that reflects the average time people between  18-64 years in the US spend in 
employment. The calibration, however, was verified for working hours range of  2 0.  to  3 0. , 
following Cooley & Prescott (1995). The key findings are consistent within this range. The 
target statistics are summarized in table 1. 
 
The parameter k  stands for the fiscal treatment of profits and is the ratio between profit 
tax and labor tax. The profit tax in this model is the tax that households pay on distributed 
profits. McGrattan & Prescott (2005) estimate a tax rate on corporate distributions for the US 
and the UK economy, which is the personal income tax rate on dividend income if 
corporations make distributions to households by paying dividends. I use their period average 
estimate of  % .4 17  for 1990-2000 for the US economy. For the average effective tax rate on 
labor income for the US economy, I use a value of  % .6 22  from Carey & Tchilinguirian 
(2000). This pins down  76991 . 0 = k . 
 
There are two convenient ways one can pin down the parameter s . First, one can simply 
assume  1 = a , which pins down  s  equal to the profit to output ratio. The second way is to 
use price mark up estimates from the literature and derive an estimate of s  that is consistent 
with the mark up value. This in turn will pin down  a  which is consistent with both profit 
ratio and the mark up value. Here I follow the latter. There is, however, some difficulty 
associated with choosing the appropriate value for price mark up. An interesting observation 
in the relevant literature is the range of estimates for the price mark up ratio (denoted  m  for 
the current setting). The estimates for price mark up ratio for the US economy ranges from as 
low as  03 1.  in Basu & Fernald (1997) to as high as  23 1.  in Bayoumi et al. (2004). There are 
even higher estimates of this ratio for particular industries of the US, as may be found in 
detail in Martins et al. (1996). For the current model, I choose  12 . 1 = m  as the price mark up 
ratio, which is the Martins  et al. (1996)’s 1970-1992 average estimate for US industries 
producing differentiated goods. Given the range of available estimates, this is a reasonable 
approximation.  This pins down  99734 . 0 = a   and  10763 . 0 = s . For the model with 
monopolistic wage setting, the baseline wage mark up estimate is therefore equal to  12 1. , 
                                                 
4 Interest rate sensitivity of the key numerical results is not noteworthy. The model was calibrated with interest 
rate values of 4%, 5% and 6%, which yielded insignificant changes in the main numerical results.   24 
which is very close to the recent estimate of  16 1.  for the US economy, as in Bayoumi et al. 
(2004). 
 
With average government consumption to output ratio equal to  23 0. , the steady state 
version of (6.1b) gives private consumption to output ratio equal to  77 . 0 . The baseline 
estimate for L and 
m L  are then  8075 . 2  and  4987 2. , respectively. Using these parameter 
values in  (10.2) gives  4963 0. = F  and  5978 0. = F
m . The parameters, their brief 
description and their baseline values are presented in table 2. For comparison and sensitivity 
of the calibrated optimal tax rate f or changes in  k  and  s , a range of values such that 
] , [ 1 0 ˛ k  with  1 0.  difference and  ] . , [ 4 0 0 ˛ s  with  05 0.  difference between two 
consecutive values, is considered. Note that varying the value for  k  and  s  requires 
recalibration of the multipliers  F and 
m F . This implies that the utility cost of raising 
revenue through distorting taxes varies for changes in fiscal treatment of profits and the 
parameter controlling the degree of monopoly power. 
 
5.2  Quantitative Findings. 
 
The main quantitative findings are summarized in table 3 and figures a-e. In constructing 
the figures, a single parameter was varied while simultaneously recalibrating the other 
parameters and the multipliers to match the long run characteristics of US data. Consider first 
calibration of the model with perfectly competitive labor market. The calibrated optimal tax 
rate is equal to  % .13 27 , which is reasonably close to the estimated average effective labor 
income tax rate of  % .7 26  and  % .6 22  for the US economy for data period 1991-1997, as 
reported in C arey & Tchilinguirian (2000), using Mendoza  et al. (1994) and Carey & 
Tchilinguirian (2000)’s methodology, respectively. Even without capital, the model therefore 
presents is a sensible imitation of the US economy. For the model with monopolistic wage 
setting, the baseline parameter values gives optimal tax rate equal to  % .21 28  --- a slightly 
higher estimate than the one for competitive labor market model. The calibrated tax estimates 
for both models are preserved for all permissible values of k , implying that the government’s 
optimal choice of tax rate is completely insensitive to its fiscal treatment of profits. This is not 
surprising, since profit tax as modelled here distorts the welfare margin only through an 
income effect. More intuitively, household’s allocation decisions are not affected at the 
margin by  k  which enables the government to choose optimal tax rate without any concern 
of its fiscal treatment of profits. 
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Table 3 presents the competitive market analogue of optimal tax rate  ) (
p t  with 
recalibrated parameters and multipliers, the baseline calibrated Ramsey tax rate  ) (t , and the 
first best tax rate  ) (
1 t  with baseline parameters, for both competitive labor market and 
monopolistic wage setting specialization of the model. For  0 = s , the optimal tax rates for 
the model with competitive labor market and monopolistic wage setting are equal to  % .97 34  
and  % .11 40 , respectively. Not surprisingly, these estimates (for  0 = s ) are also insensitive 
to changes in the parameter k . Combining these findings imply that proposition 2 holds for 
all permissible values of k ; more generally, the optimal tax rate with monopoly distortions is 
lower than its competitive market analogue irrespective of how the government treats taxes on 
distributed profits. 
 
Figure a and b present how the utility cost of distorting taxes varies with different values 
of the parameters s  and  k . Figure a shows that a higher degree of monopoly power is 
associated with a relatively lower utility cost of distorting taxes, which holds for both models. 
Higher  s  is associated with households’ willingness to pay lesser amount of time 0 
consumption goods to replace a unit of distorting tax by a unit of lump sum tax, implying that 
households facing higher monopoly distortions would be more willing to accept a distorting 
tax as a corrective device. Note that in figures a and b, the rate of decline in 
m F  is much 
sharper than that of F, implying that introducing an additional distortion in the model makes 
corrective Ramsey taxes relatively more desirable from social cost of taxation point of view. 
 
Figure c presents the Ramsey tax rates for both models for a range of values of the 
parameter s . Figures d and e compare the Ramsey taxes with the first best taxes for the 
competitive labor market model and the monopolistic wage setting model, respectively, for a 
range of values of the parameter s . For higher values of the parameter s , the optimal tax 
rate continues to be lower. For the competitive labor market model, it reaches the zero level at 
approximately  34 0. = s , and for any  s  higher than this level it becomes optimal to 
subsidize labor income. For the monopolistic wage setting model, the optimal tax reaches 
zero level for  24 0. = s  and continues to be subsidy thereafter. Since the optimal choice of 
tax rate is influenced by both the wedge between social and private marginal returns to labor 
and the diminishing utility cost of distorting taxes for higher values of the parameter s , the 
decline in 
m t  is much sharper than the decline in t . 
 
The sharp decline in optimal tax rate for extremely high values of s  indicates that with 
elastic demand for intermediate goods (and elastic demand for labor in the wage setting   26 
model), monopoly distortions create compounding effect in the wedge between social and 
private returns to labor, and it becomes optimal to cure its more than proportionate distortions 
with more than proportionate decrease in tax rates. For the monopolistic wage setting model, 
the multiplier effect is much larger, since there are multiple sources of market distortions. 
 
 
6.0  Conclusion. 
 
In order to address the issue of optimal choice of labor income tax in the presence of 
monopoly power in private market, this paper presents a simple dynamic optimal taxation 
model of an economy without capital. In the model with competitive labor market, firms in 
the intermediate goods sector exert monopoly power in pricing and hence distort the 
productive efficiency condition of the economy. In the model with monopolistic wage setting, 
monopoly power distorts productive efficiency from two sources: intermediate goods market 
and labor market. The main purpose of this study is to derive the optimal policy for labor 
income taxation, and to examine whether and how these optimal choices act as corrective 
policy. Both analytical and quantitative investigations are undertaken, which cohere to the 
same set of findings. 
 
The study finds that optimal choice of labor income tax rate is independent of how the 
government treats distributed profits fiscally. This holds for both models. This is primarily 
because as long as households treat distributed profits as exogenous, profits and profit taxes 
do not affect their equilibrium allocation decisions. The only tax that affects household’s 
decisions both through an income and incentive effect is the labor income tax. Optimal choice 
of this tax is independent of how profits are taxed. Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971) in this regard 
argue that with an exogenous upper bound on profit taxes (i.e. no confiscation), productive 
efficiency is no longer desirable. The current analysis is consistent with an extended version 
of this interpretation. More precisely, since the optimal choice of labor income tax rate is 
insensitive to how the government treats distributed profits f iscally, any level of profit 
taxation (including zero taxation) may indicate violation of the productive efficiency. This 
finding motivates the second result of the current study, i.e. optimal tax rate with monopoly 
distortions is lower than its competitive market analogue. 
 
The first best intuition of a relatively lower optimal labor income tax due to monopoly 
distortion is obvious: a lower optimal tax rate at least partly compensates for the loss of 
output due to mark up pricing (or wages). In particular, for all levels of monopoly distortion   27 
the Ramsey tax rate is lower than its competitive market analogue and higher than its first 
best counter part. The first best policy with any nonzero monopoly distortion is a subsidy, but 
the Ramsey policy for certain levels of monopoly power is a tax, and after a threshold it is a 
subsidy. Another important finding is that for remarkably high levels of monopoly distortions, 
economic agents are less willing to replace Ramsey taxes with lump sum taxes. This is a 
striking result, since in a sense it establishes that with monopoly distortion second best taxes 
are more desirable as curative devices than first best taxes. This finding also  implies that the 
Ramsey taxes are more desirable as corrective policy rather than revenue-raising policy. 
 
A relevant intuition behind these two results can be drawn from Solow (1998, ch. 2 & 3). 
In the presence of some degree of monopoly power in private market, a demand shock 
typically has multiplier like effect. Since the intermediate good’s demand (and the labor 
demand in monopolistic wage setting model) is elastic in addition, a small increase in its price 
will reduce its demand more than proportionately, which in turn will reduce the production of 
final good. Since the only factor of production of intermediate goods is labor, employment 
demand in next period will decrease making intermediate sector firms increase wages in offer. 
But with a relatively low labor input, production of intermediate goods will fall further, which 
makes the intermediate goods firms increase its price further. Hence the distorted margins of 
social and private returns to labor will continue to grow more than proportionately. The only 
way the government can compensate for this effect is to introduce a lower income tax, which 
for remarkably high levels of monopoly distortion can be a subsidy. The compounding wedge 
between social and private returns to labor makes economic agents prefer distorting taxes 
rather than lump sum tax, since high degrees of monopoly power in the pricing of an 
elastically demanded good is associated with high equilibrium profits making the first best 
lump sum tax heavier. In the model with monopolistic wage setting, the source of private 
market distortion diversifies that induces a sharper decline in Ramsey tax rate for higher 
degrees of monopoly power. 
 
Obviously, high level of market power is not a desirable situation, and a long run optimal 
steady state subsidy to both labor income and profits is also not consistent with the 
Transversality condition. However, for high degrees of monopoly power there is no need to 
tax or subsidize profits, since the optimal policy is insensitive to fiscal treatment of distributed 
profits. The optimal subsidy in the steady state therefore can be financed by bond earnings, 
which is mainly why tax exempt real government bonds play an essentially important role in 
the model.  
   28 
The lower optimal tax result may well be empirically (and policy wise) disputable when 
one considers the aggregate levels of competition and labor income tax rates in the Euro zone 
and in the US. The average effective tax rates on labor income in the Euro zone is much 
higher than in the US, although level of competition in the US is higher than that in the Euro 
zone. But deciding the equivalence of this result from  these statistics ignores the inherent 
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Tables & Figures. 
 
Table 1:  Steady state ratios for the US economy, 1960-2001. 
Ratio  Description  Value 
y
g   Government consumption to output ratio.  23 0.  
y
p   Profit to output ratio.  11 0.  
y
b   Government bond to output ratio.  51 0.  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data-FRED II. 
 
 
Table 2:  Baseline parameter values. 
Parameter  Description  Value 
b   Subjective discount rate.  9434 0.  
a   Degree of returns to scale in intermediate goods sector.  9973 0.  
s   Inverse of the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.  1076 0.  
k   Fiscal treatment of profits.  7699 0.  
L  Value of marginal disutility of labor (competitive labor market).  8075 2.  
m L   Value of marginal disutility of labor (monopolistic wage setting).  4987 2.  
 
 
Table 3:  Calibrated optimal tax rates. 
 
p t   
(Ramsey,  
0 = s ) 
t  
(Ramsey, 
1076 0. = s ) 
1 t  
(First Best, 
1076 0. = s ) 
Competitive Labor Market  3497 0.   2713 0.   1206 0. -  
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